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The Zambian cotton sector went through significant reforms during the 1990s. After a 
long period of parastatal control, a process of liberalization in cotton production and marketing 
began in 1994. These reforms were expected to benefit agricultural farmers. In Zambia, these are 
rural, often vulnerable, smallholders. This paper investigates the connection between the 
dynamics of the cotton sector and the dynamics of poverty and evaluates to what extent cotton 
can work as a vehicle for poverty alleviation. We find that cotton can indeed act as an effective 
mechanism for increased household welfare. We find income gains associated with cotton 
production as well as positive impacts on the long-run nutritional status of Zambian children. The 




The Zambian cotton sector has been profoundly reformed during the last ten years. 
Traditionally, cotton production was controlled by the government through public firms and 
parastatal organizations. Until 1994, Lintco (Lint Company of Zambia) sold inputs on loan and 
purchased cotton seeds from farmers. The reforms comprised a broad liberalization of the sector 
that included the privatization of Lintco and the encouragement of market entry. The dynamics 
of the sector include an initial phase of regional private monopsonies, and a later phase of more 
active competition. At present, the market is relatively unregulated and several firms seem to 
freely compete (but may collude) for locally produced cotton seeds. 
Poverty in Zambia is a deep phenomenon, particularly in rural areas. In 1998, for 
example, the head count was 82.1 percent. Moreover, poverty in some regions exceeded 90 
percent. Cotton is one of the key agricultural activities in rural Zambia. In cotton growing 
provinces, a large share of the cash income of rural farmers comes from the sales of cotton seeds. 
This paper studies the dynamics of cotton production and marketing and the links with 
rural poverty. It has long been claimed that cash crops can work as an effective vehicle for 
poverty alleviation in rural areas. Hence, we set out to explore whether cotton can actually be 
trusted to achieve significant reductions in poverty in Zambia. 
We start by reviewing the reforms in the cotton sector. Since cotton can only be produced 
in selected regions in Zambia, we examine the trends in poverty and cotton income in different 
provinces. To investigate the role of cotton as a source of household income, we perform two 
different empirical exercises. First, we look at the evolution of the share of income generated by 
cotton and we simulate the poverty impacts brought about by an increase in cotton prices and an  
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expansion of the sector. Second, we evaluate the potential impact of subsistence households 
switching to cotton production. We look at income differentials, anthropometric measures and 
educational outcomes. 
Our findings are mixed. On the one hand, we find that cotton production is associated 
with higher household income, lower poverty, and higher welfare. This result has two 
components. First, higher cotton prices would benefit rural farmers directly. Second, cotton 
farmers enjoy income gains and long-run nutritional gains as compared to subsistence farmers. 
On the other hand, we find that the estimated magnitudes are not as large as expected. Very large 
price changes of cotton seeds or very large supply responses would be needed to estimate 
empirically meaningful reductions in poverty rates. We conclude that international trade in 
cotton is indeed a promising activity for rural farmers, but that there is a long way to go to 
achieve the full benefits from increased market access and higher prices. Reforms in the 
provision of infrastructure, access to credit, extension services, and social services are essential 
complementary policies to market access and liberalization of agricultural markets in the 
developed world. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we review the main reforms in cotton 
markets, we discuss the characteristics of world cotton markets, and we provide a poverty profile 
of Zambian households. In section 2, we look at cotton as a source of cash income, and we 
simulate the impacts of market access and higher international prices. In section 3, we estimate 
income differential gains in cotton over subsistence agriculture. We study non-monetary 
outcomes as well, like educational and nutritional status. In section 4, we review our main results 
and we summarize our conclusions.  
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1.  Cotton Reforms and Poverty Trends in Zambia 
 
  Zambia is a landlocked country located in southern central Africa. Clockwise, neighbors 
are Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and Angola.
4  In 
2000, the total population was 10.7 million inhabitants. With a per capita GDP of only 302 US 
dollars, Zambia is one of the poorest countries in the world and is considered a least developed 
country. 
  The Republic of Zambia achieved Independence in 1964. A key characteristic of the 
country is its abundance in natural resources, particularly mineral deposits (like copper) and 
land. Due to high copper prices, the new Republic did quite well in the initial stages of 
development. Poverty and inequality, however, were widespread and this raised concerns among 
the people and the policymakers. Soon, the government began to adopt interventionist policies, 
with a much larger participation of the state in national development. Interventions included 
import substitution, price controls of all major agricultural products (like maize), nationalization 
of manufacturing, agricultural marketing and mining. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the decline in copper prices and the negative external conditions 
led to stagnation and high levels of external debt. A crisis emerged and a structural adjustment 
program was implemented between 1983 and 1985. Riots in 1986 forced the government to later 
abandon the reforms in 1987. A second IMF program failed in 1989, when the removal of 
controls in maize led to significant price increases. 
In 1991, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) was elected. Faced with a 
sustained, severe recession and with a meager future, the new government began economy-wide 
                                                 
4This section relies heavily on Balat and Porto (2004).  
  4
reforms including macroeconomic stabilization, exchange rate liberalization, fiscal restructuring, 
removal of maize subsidies, decontrol of agricultural prices, privatization of agricultural 
marketing, and trade and industrial policy. For a more detailed description of the reforms, see 
World Bank (1994), McCulloch et al. (2001) and Litchfield and McCulloch (2003). 
1.1  Cotton Reforms 
 
The cotton sector was significantly affected by the agricultural reforms adopted by 
Zambia during the 1990s.
5  Before 1994, intervention in cotton markets was widespread and 
involved setting prices for sales of certified cotton seeds, pesticides, and sprayers, providing 
subsidized inputs to producers, facilitating access to credit, etc. From 1977 to 1994, the Lint 
Company of Zambia (Lintco) acted as a nexus between local Zambian producers and 
international markets. Lintco had a monopsony in seed cotton markets, and a monopoly in inputs 
sales and credit loans to farmers. 
The reforms of the mid-1990s eliminated most of these interventions and markets were 
liberalized. Since Lintco was sold to Lonrho Cotton in 1994, a domestic monopsony developed 
early after liberalization. As market opportunities arose, several firms (private ginners such as 
Swarp Textiles and Clark Cotton) entered the Zambian cotton market. This initial phase of 
liberalization, however, did not succeed in introducing much competition in the sector. This is 
because the three major firms segmented the market geographically. In consequence, 
liberalization gave rise to geographical monopsonies rather than national oligopsonies. 
At that moment, Lonrho and Clark Cotton developed an outgrower scheme with the 
Zambian farmers. This scheme allowed ginners to expand production and take advantage of 
economies of scale and idle capacity. In these outgrower programs, firms provided seeds and 
                                                 
5For more details on cotton reforms in Zambia, see Food Security Research Project (2000) and Cotton News (2002).  
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inputs on loans, together with extension services to improve productivity. The value of the loan 
was deducted from the sales of cotton seeds to the ginners at picking time. Prices paid for the 
harvest supposedly depended upon international prices. Initially, repayment rates were high 
(around roughly 86 percent) and cotton production significantly increased. 
By 1997, the expansion of the cotton production base attracted new entrants, such as 
Amaka Holdings and Continental Textiles. Instead of the localized monopsonies, entrants and 
incumbents started competing in many districts. As a result of entry, the capacity for ginning 
increased beyond production levels. This caused an excess demand for cotton seeds and 
tightened the competition among ginners for Zambian cotton. In addition, some entrants that 
were not using outgrower schemes started offering higher prices for cotton seeds to farmers who 
had already signed contracts with other firms. This caused repayment problems and increased the 
rate of loan defaults. 
The relationship between ginners and farmers started to deteriorate. On top of all this, 
world prices began to decline, and farm-gate prices declined as a result. After many years of high 
farm-gate prices, and with limited information on world market conditions, farmers started to 
mistrust the ginners and suspicions of exploitation arose. In consequence, farmers felt that 
outgrowers’ contracts were being breached, and default rates increased. This led firms to 
increase the price of the loans charged to farmers, who, in the end, received a lower net price for 
their crops. 
Partly as a result of this failure of the outgrower scheme, Lonrho announced its sale in 
1999 and Dunavant Zambia Limited entered the market. Nowadays, the major players in cotton 
markets in Zambia are Dunavant (Z) Limited, Clark Cotton Limited, Amaka Holdings Limited, 
Continental Ginneries Limited, Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles and Mukuba Textiles.  
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At present, most cotton production in Zambia is carried out under the outgrower scheme. 
Farmers and firms understood the importance of honoring contracts and the benefits of 
maintaining a good reputation. The outgrower programs were perfected and there are now two 
systems utilized by different firms: the Farmer Group System and the Farmer Distributor 
System. In the latter, firms designate one individual or farmer as the distributor and provide 
inputs. The distributor prepares individual contracts with the farmers. He is also in charge of 
assessing reasons for loan defaults, being able, in principle, of condoning default in special 
cases. He is in charge of renegotiating contracts in incoming seasons. In the Farmer Group 
System, small scale producers deal with the ginneries directly, purchasing inputs on loan and 
repaying at the time of harvest. Both systems seem to work well. 
1.2  International Markets and World Prices 
 
The production of cotton and the international trade of cotton products are, and have 
traditionally been, subject to significant interventions. The distortions include taxes (either 
directly or indirectly through state marketing monopsonies (parastatals), border intervention 
(tariffs, quotas), production and export support, and input subsidies. Aksoy and Beghin (2004) 
summarize the markets for different commodities including cotton. They suggest that the 
combined support in cotton production in the major world producers (US, China, Greece, Spain, 
Turkey, Brazil, Mexico and Egypt) between 1997/98 and 2001/02 ranged from $3.8 to $5.3 
billion. 
We turn next to briefly review some of the interventions adopted by some of the main 
producers, namely the United States and the European Union. Our summary is based on Baffes 
(2004), who provide more details on cotton markets, policies, and prospects. In the United 
States, intervention in cotton production is regulated by Farm Bills, like the 1996 and 2002 bills.  
  7
They establish price and income support (usually de-couple payments based on historical areas 
planted), tariffs, quotas, public agricultural research, provision of infrastructure (irrigation), 
export subsidies, export credit, subsidized loans and insurance, etc. The 2002 Farm Bill is 
expected to be in place for the next six years. 
The European Union intervenes in cotton production to provide support to Spanish and 
Greek producers. Under the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union, support is 
given to cotton growers based on the difference between the market price and a guide (i.e. 
support) price. Advance payments are calculated on the basis of estimated cotton production. 
Ginners receive these payments and pass-through them to producers in the form of higher prices. 
The effects of the removal of cotton distortions in world markets have been widely 
researched. Some of the literature is reviewed by Baffes (2004). He reports results from FAPRI 
(2002), which showed that under global agricultural liberalization world cotton prices would 
increase, on average, by 12.7 percent. Using similar methods, Sumner (2004) reports price 
increases following different scenarios of cotton reforms. On average, his findings indicate an 
expected increase of 11.58 percent in world cotton prices. These numbers are in line with those 
reported by Baffes (2004). Notice, however, that the latter paper focuses mostly on the impact on 
world prices of the elimination of US domestic support. The comparison of Baffes and Sumner 
results would indicate that most of the price changes that can be expected from the liberalization 
of world markets would be generated by US policies. This is confirmed by Hoekman, Nicita and 
Olarrega (2004), who report much lower cotton price changes from a Doha scenario that 
considers the elimination of trade barriers without changes in domestic support. It is unclear 
whether the reforms needed to achieve these increases in prices are reasonable or even feasible. 
Nevertheless, in section 2 below, we use these estimates to simulate the poverty effects on rural  
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Zambian farmers. But before doing that, we review the poverty trends observed in Zambia 
during the 1990s. 
1.3  Poverty Trends 
 
In spite of the significant reforms adopted by the Zambian government and of the 
significant intervention in international agricultural markets, Zambia is one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Furthermore, poverty rates tended to increase during the 1990s. 
Our description of the poverty trends is based on three household surveys, the 1991 
Priority Surveys, and the 1996 and 1998 Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys.
6  The Priority 
Survey of 1991 is a Social Dimension of Adjustment (SDA) survey. It was conducted between 
October and November and covered a total of 9,886 households. Sample sizes were increased to 
11,750 and 16,800 households in the 1996 and 1998 LCM Surveys. 
Table 6.1 reports the poverty dynamics. In 1991, the poverty rate at the national level was 
69.6 percent. Poverty increased in 1996, when the head count reached 80 percent, and then 
declined towards 1998, with a head count of 71.5 percent. In rural areas, poverty is widespread; 
the head count was 88.3 percent in 1991, 90.5 percent in 1996 and 82.1 percent in 1998. Urban 
areas fared better, with a poverty rate of 47.2 percent in 1991, 62.1 percent in 1996 and 53.4 
percent in 1998. In what follows, our focus is on rural areas. 
Poverty trends by provinces are reported in Table 6.2. Zambia is a large country, and 
provinces differ substantially in basic characteristics like land quality, distance to the capital, 
roads, etc. In particular, cotton, the commodity under investigation here, can be produced (due to 
soil characteristics) in only the Southern, the Central, and the Eastern provinces. At the national 
level, poverty increased from 1991 to 1996 and then declined in 1998. Poverty trends in Lusaka, 
                                                 
6The Zambia Central Statistical Office, CSO, is in charge of conducting the surveys. The data from the 2001 LCMS 
was under preparation when this paper was written.  
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the Copperbelt, and the North-Western province are similar to those at the national level. In the 
Central province, poverty first declined in 1996 and then increased in 1998. In the remaining 
provinces, particularly in the Eastern and Southern provinces, poverty has declined throughout 
the whole periods. 
2.  Cotton Income and Higher Export Prices 
 
In this section, we investigate the potential effects of higher cotton prices on household 
income in rural Zambia. As argued by Deaton (1989, 1997) and others, the short-run effects of 
price changes can be assessed by looking at income shares. In Table 6.3, we report the average 
income shares for different sources of income. At the national level, the main sources of income 
are income from home consumption (42.5 percent), income from non-farm businesses (16.8 
percent), sales of food crops (9.1 percent), Livestock & Poultry (8.1 percent), and wages (6.9 
percent). Interestingly, the differences in income sources between poor and non-poor households 
are not very significant. 
Due to regional variation in soil, climate, and infrastructure, the relevant sources of 
income may be different for households residing in different provinces. To see this, we report in 
Table 6.4 the main sources of agricultural household income in the rural areas of the nine 
Zambian provinces. The table shows the average share of total income accounted for by a given 
activity. We observe that in the Central, Eastern, and Southern provinces, the most relevant cash 
crop activity is cotton. In the remaining provinces, cotton is not a feasible option and income 
shares are negligible or zero. In the remaining of this paper, thus, we investigate the impacts of 
cotton reforms only in the relevant provinces. 
Figure 6.1 displays the dynamics of cotton shares. We estimate the average cotton share 
conditional on household per capita income. These averages are estimated with non-parametric  
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locally weighted regressions. These are local linear regressions that weigh the data using kernel 
methods. We follow Fan (1992) and Pagan and Ullah (1999). We estimate a different non-
parametric regression using data for 1996 and 1998.
7  The inspection of figure 6.1 provides 
details of the evolution of cotton as a cash crop in rural Zambia. 
Both in 1996 and 1998, the cotton income shares increase at the very bottom of the 
income distribution and then decline with income. The maximum share is roughly over 10 
percent. At the upper tail, the average share is quite small, of around 2 percent. As regards cotton 
dynamics, the average share is higher in 1998 at the bottom of the distribution (mostly poor 
households) and at its upper tail. In the middle of the income distribution, the cotton income 
share is higher in 1996 than in 1998. 
It is instructive to look at the evolution of cotton shares across the different cotton-
producing provinces. Figures 2 to 4 plot the non-parametric averages for the Central, the Eastern, 
and the Southern provinces, respectively. In the Central province, for instance, cotton income 
shares in 1998 track the shares in 1996 at the bottom of the distribution, but become smaller at 
the middle. The Central province resembles the pattern at the national level, with higher average 
shares in 1998 at to bottom and at the top of the distribution, and lower shares at the middle. In 
contrast, cotton shares in the Southern province are higher across the entire income distribution 
in 1998 than in 1996. 
The results in the previous figures indicate a regionally differentiated effect of the 
reforms on the pattern on income sources in rural Zambia. In particular, the increase in cotton 
shares in the Southern province is remarkable. Since this is the region that is perhaps closest to 
the capital, the result indicates that access to markets and infrastructure are key variables in 
adoption and in the deepening on cotton production. 
                                                 
7  Unfortunately, the 1991 Priority Survey does not include data on cotton income separately.  
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The link between these dynamics of cotton shares and the timing of the cotton reforms is 
straightforward. This would indicate that the increase in cotton shares, particularly among 
poorest farmers and in the Southern province, can be attributed to those reforms. This, however, 
does not necessarily follows. There are other factors simultaneously affecting cotton shares. Key 
factors include the collapse of the copper sector, the adoption of macroeconomic reforms, and 
the exogenous changes in international cotton prices. Given the available data, it is impossible 
for us to disentangle the contribution of these different factors to the observed trends in cotton 
shares. But we next argue that it is very likely that the marketing reforms are the major 
determinants. 
The collapse of the copper sector (mainly due to a declining trend in international copper 
prices) is perhaps an urban phenomenon, rather than a rural phenomenon. In addition, copper is 
mainly associated with the Copperbelt province (where the copper mines and the industrial belt 
are located) and with Lusaka (the administrative center). It seems, therefore, that cotton 
producing provinces would be relatively unaffected by changes in the copper sector. It should be 
noticed, however, that the general equilibrium effects of the dramatic changes in a traditionally 
important sector of the Zambian economy cannot be ignored. 
Similar remarks apply to the adoption of other economic policies. There is one important 
reform that has to be carefully considered, though. Zambia used to have a maize marketing board 
that set producer prices for maize grain and consumer prices for maize meals. As in cotton, the 
marketing board was eliminated as well. This is a major rural reform, and we should expect it to 
have significant effects on the allocation of agricultural resources and on cotton shares. 
Importantly, the maize reforms took place in 1993, well before the 1996-1998 period that we are 
investigating. Accordingly, we speculate that the effects of the maize reforms have already taken  
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place in 1996, the baseline period in our analysis.
8  To the extent, however, that these reforms 
have long-lasting effects on farmers, the observed dynamics in figures 1 to 4 will capture them. 
There is another element that favors the role of the reform as a major determinant of 
cotton dynamics. An important observation is that the increase in cotton income shares is larger 
at the bottom of the distribution of per capita expenditure, i.e., among poorest households. If 
macroeconomic and aggregate shocks, with magnitudes that affect all households 
simultaneously, are size-neutral, then we shouldn’t expect differences in the impacts at different 
points along the income distribution. This indicates, at least, that the relative changes in cotton 
dynamics are mostly generated by the marketing reforms. For instance, the larger increase in 
shares at the bottom of the distribution can be due to expanded access to seeds and fertilizers 
among the poor. 
Finally, it is important to have in mind that cotton prices have continuously declined 
during this period. From 1996 to 1998, in particular, the real price of cotton in international 
markets has declined by as much as 20 percent.
9  There are two implications for our analysis. 
First, the dynamics in figures 1 to 4 show that cotton shares could have been even higher, in the 
face of the reform, had cotton prices been higher or remained stable. In other words, it would be 
reasonable to expect larger increases in cotton shares due to the cotton reforms if we could 
control for the change in cotton prices. Second, the decline in the real prices of agricultural 
products has been similar for other commodities such as maize, the major alternative crop in 
                                                 
8Similarly, the collapse of Zimbabwe has had significant impacts on the Zambian rural economy. It is observed, for 
instance, that tobacco has been increasingly adopted in Zambia, mainly due to the migration of neighboring peasants 
from Zimbabwe. However, the Zimbabwean crisis took place in recent years, after 1998, and should not affect our 
analysis. 
9The decline around the long term trend seems to be, however, lower. See Food Security Research Project (2000).  
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rural Zambia. This suggests that the changes in the price of cotton relative to maize has been 
mild.
10  
In summary, the available information prevents the econometric identification of the 
effects of the cotton reforms on the dynamics of cotton shares among Zambian farmers. But we 
have argued that the observed trends can be mostly linked to those reforms, and that the induced 
increase in cotton shares could have been larger. This is an interesting instance of a domestic 
policy that had crucial impacts on the farmers and on their ability to reap most of the benefits 
from further trade liberalization. 
In what follows, we investigate the effects of the complementarities between domestic 
reforms and international agricultural liberalization on household welfare. As shown in section 1, 
international cotton markets are subject to strong intervention, particularly by developed 
countries. We begin by looking at the welfare effects of the increase in world prices that would 
take place if agricultural markets were liberalized. More concretely, we merge the analysis of 
cotton shares with increases in world cotton prices. 
Define the household income as  
 









c is the income (profit) from cotton sales and π
h
j is income from activity j (wages, 
vegetables, maize, groundnuts, etc.). The change in income caused by an increase in the price of 
cotton pc is  
 
                                                 
10See Food Security Research Project (2000).  
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   dlnyh=θ
h
cdlnpc. (1) 
The proportional change in household income is given by the share of cotton income, θ
h
c, 
multiplied by the proportional change in prices. 
  In section 1, we reviewed some evidence indicating that a full liberalization of 
agricultural markets along the lines of the Doha Round negotiations would bring about an 
increase in world cotton prices of around 12.7 percent. Similar results are obtained if we use the 
price increase predicted by Sumner (2004) of 11.6 percent. Using the data for 1998, we can 
estimate the average welfare effect given by equation (1). These averages, estimated again with a 
Fan regression, are shown in figure 6.5. We observe that the increase in prices would benefit 
farmers across the income distribution. The effects would range from over 0.75 to nearly 1.5 
percent, at the bottom of the distribution, to roughly 0.5 percent at the top. The unconditional 
average gain would be around 1 percent of the initial household per capita income. 
  Figure 6.6 explores the regional differences in cotton gains. The solid line corresponds to 
the non-parametric average in the Central province; the broken line, to the non-parametric 
average in the Eastern province; and the dotted like, to the non-parametric averages in the 
Southern province. The figure shows that larger gains would take place in the Eastern province, 
particularly at the bottom of the distribution. In the Central province, the gains track the average 
gains in the Southern province at the bottom of the distribution; from the middle to the top, 
however, the gains in the Central province remain high, whereas the gains in the Southern 
province sharply decline with income. 
  These findings show that a 12.7 percent increase in the price of cotton would cause 
household income to increase, at most, by 1.5 percent (among the poorest households in the 
Eastern province, for instance). Although these are positive effects associated with welfare gains,  
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it is clear that the magnitudes are quite small. There are several reasons that help explain this 
fact. 
  As discussed in Section 1, the reforms in cotton markets have been relatively successful 
but have not been smooth. Initially, the public monopoly was transformed into a private 
monopoly. Entry was useful in early stages, but the failure of the outgrowing scheme limited the 
expansion of the sector. In fact, the outgrower scheme was still failing in 1998, when the 
household survey data was collected. This means that the evolution in income shares that we can 
capture with the available data does not reveal the whole benefits on the reforms. 
  Using additional farm data, Brambilla and Porto (2005) report that the cotton reforms had 
two distinctive effects on cotton farming. First, there is a decline of the land area devoted to 
cotton in 1998-1999 (when the outgrowing scheme was failing) followed by a significant 
increase in area planted in 2000-2001, when the outgrower scheme was perfected with the 
entrance of Dunavant. Second, the authors find that farm productivity in cotton showed a similar 
pattern, declining in 1998-1999 and increasing in 2000-2001. In additional, their findings 
indicate that income shares increased, on average, by roughly 10-20 percent. These additional 
factors could help increase the average gains from a 12 percent price increase to roughly 2 
percent of household income, on average. Although these figures are higher, the effects seem 
still fairly low. The study by Brambilla and Porto (2005) reveals another reason why the increase 
in cotton prices may not have large impacts. Productivity of smallholder cotton production has 
been traditionally very low in Zambia. Although there is some evidence that the reforms have 
caused productivity to increase in recent years, there is still room for improvements in this area. 
  One additional reason for the small impacts is that cotton activities are not really 
widespread in Zambia. More importantly, we have only considered a first order approximation to  
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the welfare gains. In the following section, we capture some supply responses and second round 
effects. 
  It should be pointed out that the present paper only explores the poverty alleviation effect 
of cotton production in rural areas by smallholders. There are vertical linkages in cotton 
production that suggest that significant additional poverty effects could be secured through the 
domestic production of textiles and garment products for exports. These important issues, that 
deserve further consideration and analysis, are not the focus of our investigation. 
3.  Cotton Production and Household Outcomes 
 
  In this section, we explore the impacts of cotton production on household outcomes. If 
free trade and cotton liberalization bring about renewed incentives for cotton production in 
Zambia, we expect farmers to switch from subsistence to cotton production (and, more generally, 
to market-oriented agriculture). In what follows, we explore these supply responses with the help 
of matching methods: by matching households in subsistence agriculture with households in 
cotton, we estimate the average effects of participating in cotton markets on several household 
outcomes. We focus on income differentials, children anthropometry, and education outcomes.
11  
 3.1  The  Method 
  Our aim is to estimate the differences in outcomes linked to the production of a cash crop 
such as cotton, and to explore the poverty alleviation effects of allowing for an expansion of 
cotton activities among Zambian farmers. We use matching methods based on the propensity 
                                                 
11The estimation of supply responses has proved very difficult. The survey in Winters, McCulloch and McKay 
(2004) highlights these issues and reports some of the available methods and results. For the case of income gains, 
see Lopez, Nash and Stanton (1995) and Heltberg and Tarp (2001). For non-monetary outcomes, see Edmonds and 
Pavcnik (2004).  
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score.
12  We begin by estimating a probit model of participation into cotton, which defines the 
propensity score p(x), for a given vector of observables x. Subsistence farmers are matched with 
cotton farmers based on this propensity score, and the outcome differential is estimated using 
kernel methods. 
  Let us start with the income gains. Let y
m
h be the income per hectare in cotton of 
household h. Let y
s
h be the home produced own consumption per hectare. The average income 





Our task is to estimate the counterfactual quantity E[y
s
h|C=1], the average return in subsistence 
agriculture among cotton farmers. We do this by using matching methods. 
  The main assumption of matching methods is that the participation into market 
agriculture can be based on observables. This is the ignorability of treatment assignment. Define 
an indicator variable C, where C=1 if the households derive most of their income from cotton. In 
practice, most Zambian households in rural areas produce something for own consumption. As a 
consequence, we assign C=1 to households that derive more than 50 percent of their income 
from cotton. Households that derive most of their income from home production are assigned 
C=0. The propensity score p(x) is defined as the conditional probability of participating in 
cotton, p(x)=P(C=1|x). 




h⊥C | x. When the propensity 
score is balanced, we know that conditional on p(x), the participation in cotton C and the 
observables x are independent. In other words, observations with a given propensity score have 
the same distribution of observables x for households involved in cotton as in subsistence. The 
                                                 
12Seminal papers on matching methods include Rubin (1977), Rosembaun and Rubin (1983), Heckman, Ichimura 
and Todd (1997) and (1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1996), and Dehejia and Wahba (2002).  
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importance of the balancing property, which can be tested, is that it implies that, conditionally on 
p(x), the returns in cotton and in subsistence are independent of market participation, which 
implies that households in subsistence and cotton are comparable. 
The decision to participate in market agriculture depends on three main variables: access to 
markets, food security and risk, and tradition in subsistence agriculture. We capture these effects 
by including in the propensity function several key control variables like regional (district) 
dummies, the size of the household, the demographic structure of the family, the age and the 
education of the household head, and the availability of agricultural tools. We believe these 
variables x comprise a comprehensive set of observables to explain the selection mechanism. 
Once the propensity score is estimated, we test the balancing condition. This requires 
partitioning the estimated p(x) and testing that, within each stratum, the mean and variances of 
the covariates are not statistically different.
13  In the current case of cotton, the balancing 
property was always satisfied.
14  
 3.2  Monetary  Outcomes 
  In this paper, we investigate a constrained model of household agricultural production. 
This means that households are assumed to face significant constraints in terms of land, family 
labor supply, or inputs. This means that there would be forgone income by expanding cash crop 
activities. In this model, if a family were to plant an additional acre of cotton, then an acre of 
land devoted to own-consumption (and all other relevant resources) should be released. 
                                                 
13In general, this involves setting up a series of F-test for the equality of means, for instance. See Dehejia and Whaba 
(2002) for more details. 
14The balancing property is a minor requirement that we impose in our procedure. In many applications, the property 
is not necessarily satisfied. In Balat and Porto (2004), for example, we found that the balancing did not hold in cases 
including cassava or sunflowers. Notice that we cannot test the ignorability requirement, which is an assumption of 
the matching method.  
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  Table 5 reports the results. The first column shows the gains per hectare. In the second 
column, the constrained household is assumed to expand cotton production by the average size 
of the plots devoted to cotton in Zambia. Our results indicate that there are gains from cotton 
production: farmers growing cotton are expected to gain 18,232 kwachas, on average, more than 
similar farmers engaged in subsistence agriculture. The gain is equivalent to 19.9 percent of the 
average expenditure of a representative poor farmer. To get a better sense of what these numbers 
mean, notice that the food poverty line in 1998 was estimated at Kw 32,233 per month and the 
poverty line, at 46,287 per month (per equivalent adult). Further, since the exchange rate in 
December 1998 was around 2,200Kw, the gains are equivalent to just over 8 US dollars (in 1998 
prices). 
  The actual gains will depend on the land area allocated to cotton. If farmers are allowed 
to plant the average size of a typical cotton plot, which is estimated at 1.2 hectares, the estimated 
gains increase to Kw 21,878. This is equivalent to 23.9 percent of the income of the poor. Notice 
that since the average size of the land plots allocated to home production ranges from 1.5 to 5 
hectares, with an unconditional average of around 2 hectares, it would be feasible for an average 
household to switch from own-consumption to cotton growing activities. 
  Our matching results suggest that there might be additional gains from switching to 
cotton. A natural question is why these opportunities are not exploited by the farmers. While 
there are many reasons that can explain this fact, we want to emphasize here the key role of 
complementary policies. Access to international markets is a basic prerequisite. This requires 
openness and export oriented incentives on behalf of Zambia, but also a liberalization of 
agricultural markets in developed countries. Price and income support, and export and input 
subsidies should be eliminated. But other domestic complementary policies should be 
implemented as well. We identify several key policies. Extension services to farmers, including  
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transmission of information and know-how about cropping, crop diversification, fertilizer and 
pesticide use, etc., are critical. The provision of infrastructure to reduce transport and transaction 
costs is also essential. Irrigation may also help. The development of a stronger financial and 
credit market can also help farmers reduce the costs of the outgrower programs. Finally, 
education (both formal education and labor discipline) and the provision of better health services 
will surely help increase farm productivity in cotton. 
  It is generally difficult to assess the role of complementary policies empirically. But we 
are in a position to provide some sense of their importance by looking at pieces of evidence 
reported in the related literature. In Brambilla and Porto (2005), for example, the authors find 
that farmers that received extension services are 8.4 percent more productive in cotton than 
farmers that did not receive any technical assistance. Ceteris paribus, this would imply an 8.4 
increase in household well-being. This clearly shows that complementary policies can indeed be 
useful to improve the living conditions of poor farmers in rural Zambia. Of course a 
comprehensive assessment of such policies would require an evaluation of the costs of providing 
these improved services. 
  In our view, the role of Doha is not only to provide a higher price for cotton, but also to 
facilitate market access. Complementary policies can help farmers to fully exploit these 
opportunities. So far, we have explored the effects of increasing prices on household income, and 
we have provided a quantification of the potential gains of switching from subsistence to cotton. 
We think of Doha and the complementary policies as vehicles to make these gains feasible. To 
look at these links more closely, we perform the following experiment. The increase in prices 
caused by the Doha development round would induce an expansion of quantities produced. If 
these quantities could be produced and sold by Zambian farmers, then the realization of the gains 
becomes feasible.  
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  To quantify these effects, we proceed as follows. First, there is some quantity changes 
induced by Doha. This could be estimated, for instance, by multiplying the price changes 
reported in section 1 by an export supply elasticity. As an example, if this elasticity were one, an 
increase in price of 12.7 percent would cause quantities to react by 12.7 percent too.
15  Given 
these quantity changes, the issue is how to allocate them to the different households. To do this, 
notice that the estimated propensity score indicates the probability of being a cotton producer. 
One reasonable scenario is thus to allocate the quantity changes on the basis of the relative 
propensity score. It is important to notice that by proceeding in this way, we are allowing 
households in subsistence to switch to some production of cotton. However, this switch can be 
minor if the relative probability is small for particular farmers. In addition, farmers that are 
already producing cotton are more likely to have higher estimated probabilities, which can make 
them better candidates to absorb larger fractions of the export opportunities. 
  Figure 6.7 plots the average relative probability of being a cotton producer across the 
income distribution. The curve is estimated with non-parametric methods, as before. We see that 
the relative probability, and therefore the gains from any expansion in quantities, slightly 
increases with income at the bottom of the distribution and then remains relatively constant. We 
interpret this finding as indicating that everyone across the entire income distribution would 
benefit about the same from the Doha market opportunities. 
  In figure 6.8, we plot the relative probabilities for the three provinces. As before, the 
solid line corresponds to the case of the Central province, the broken line, to the Eastern 
province, and the dotted line, to the case of the Southern province. Although there are 
differences in the level of the relative probability across provinces (that should resemble the 
                                                 
15See Hoekman, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2004) for an nice attempt along these lines.  
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regional differences in the likelihood of cotton production), the distributional effects are the 
same in all three provinces. No discernible differences across the income distribution can be 
expected. 
  It is tempting to use this framework to allocate the potential export opportunities brought 
about by Doha across Zambian farmers and to identify households that would actually switch 
from subsistence to cotton. In addition, it would be possible to guess how much substitution 
would take place for different households. To do this, however, we need to recourse to ad-hoc 
rules that would dictate the pattern of agricultural switching. While some interesting attempts to 
do this (in the context of labor markets) are being developed, here we have decided to report 
only the estimated relative probabilities of switching. This approach provides estimates of 
expected gains, which is as far as we can go with the available data and methods. It has the virtue 
of being based on estimates derived from econometric models rather than from ad-hoc rules. 
  Nevertheless, we can use our estimates to shed additional light on the impacts of Doha 
and complementary reforms in Zambia. As reported in Table 5, the estimated gain from 
switching from subsistence agriculture to cotton would be 19.9 percent. This is a measure of the 
gains from switching, even in the absence of trade reforms. The price effect (roughly a 12.7 
percent increase in cotton prices due to trade reforms) would cause the average income of a 
cotton producer to increase by approximately 1 percent (figure 6.6). If trade reforms induce a 
switch from subsistence to cotton, then the gains of a switcher would be of about 20.9 percent 
(19.9 percent due to higher cotton returns plus 1 percent due to higher prices). An expansion of 
quantities produced and exported (supply responses) would generate additional gains. An 
example would be the productivity gains of around 8.4 percent (Brambilla and Porto, 2005) 
induced by successful extension services and made feasible by world markets (through Doha). 
The average income of a cotton producer would increase by 9.4 percent and that of a subsistence  
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farmer by 29.3 percent. We can conclude, thus, that although the price effect of trade reforms 
(tariffs plus subsidies in cotton) would be generally small, the combination of new market 
opportunities and domestic reforms (so that switching and productivity gains become viable) can 
work as very effective vehicles for poverty alleviation. 
3.3 Non-Monetary  Outcomes 
  We turn now to the non-monetary effects of cotton production. We look at the effects on 
two household outcomes, namely the nutritional status of infants and young children (from 0 to 
60 months old) and education performance of children in primary and secondary school. 
  Malnutrition remains a widespread problem in developing countries, as in Zambia. We 
assess the nutritional status on the basis of anthropometric indicators (such as height or weight). 
We analyze the three most commonly used anthropometric indicators for infants and children: 
weight-for-height, height-for-age, and weight-for-age. 
Weight-for-height (whz) measures body weight relative to height. It is normally used as 
an indicator of current nutritional status, and can be useful for measuring short-term changes in 
nutritional status. Extreme cases of low whz relative to a child of the same sex and age in a 
reference population are commonly referred to as “wasting”. Wasting may be the consequence of 
starvation or severe disease (in particular diarrhea), but it can also be due to chronic conditions. 
Height-for-age (haz) reflects cumulative linear growth. haz deficits indicate past or chronic 
inadequacies nutrition and/or chronic or frequent illness, but cannot measure short-term changes 
in malnutrition. Extreme cases of low haz are referred to as “stunting”. Weight-for-age (waz) 
reflects body mass relative to age. This is, in effect, a composite measure of height-for-age and 
weight-for-height, making interpretation difficult. The term “underweight” is commonly used to 
refer to severe or pathological deficits in waz.  
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A problem arises as weight and height depend on both age and gender (and other factors 
such as genetic variation) but it is possible to use physical measurements by comparing 
indicators with the distribution of the same indicator for a “healthy” reference group. In this way 
we use z-scores (standard deviation scores) which is the most common way of expressing 
anthropometric indices.
16  Table 6 presents some summary statistics. 
  The value of the mean of the haz z-score is –2.21, reflecting long-term cumulative 
inadequacies of health and/or nutrition.
17  There seems to be no wasting problem, the mean of 
whz is 0.23. Using the summary measure of nutritional status (waz) there is mild underweight, 
probably caused by long-term nutritional problems. 
For the education outcome, we generated an index of school performance for children 
between ages 7 and 18, that is, children in primary and secondary school. The index is the ratio 
of years of education completed by an individual and the years of education this individual 
should have for his age.
18  The mean of this index for rural areas is 0.49 including children not 
attending school (approximately 45% of the sample). 
We now describe the exercises performed using the same matching methods as before. 
We want to assess the effects of participation in cotton production in other dimensions than 
monetary income. We estimate the effects on child nutrition and education of a switching from 
subsistence to cotton. Table 6 reports the results. 
We estimate differences in outcomes for the sample of all infants and young children (0 
to 59 months old), for the subsample of males, and for the subsample of females. Interestingly, 
we find statistically significant effects only in terms of stunting, or long-run nutritional gains. On 
                                                 
16A z-score is defined as the difference between the value for an individual and the median value of the reference 
population for the same age or height, divided by the standard deviation of the reference population. 
17The WHO uses a z-score cut-off point of -2 to classify low weight-for-age, low height-for-age and low weight-for-
height as moderate and severe undernutrition, and –3 to define severe undernutrition. 
18Then, for an individual with no education the index takes a 0 and if she is in the grade that corresponds to her age 
the index takes 1.  
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average, a cotton family would enjoy a higher z-score of 0.64 points. This is equivalent to 30 
percent of the average haz z-score for households in subsistence. There are no significant 
differences in wasting and underweight between cotton and subsistence households. Also, there 
is no differential effect between females and males, although the magnitudes for males are much 
larger and marginally significant. Similar results have been found in, for example, von Braun and 
Kennedy (1994). 
  These are very interesting results. They indicate that there are no differences in current 
nutrition among children living in cotton producing or subsistence households. However, there 
are statistically significant benefits in terms of long-term nutrition among those children living 
on cotton farms. One interpretation is that whereas doing cotton or subsistence allows children to 
be currently well fed, through the consumption of maize or sweet potatoes for instance, cash 
income derived from cotton would allows farmers to purchase milk, fish, or dairy products that 
have longer term benefits. Another hypothesis argues that the movement from subsistence to 
agricultural commercialization implies a change in the use of fertilizers and pesticides that helps 
prevent health hazards and improve the long-term nutritional status on the children.
19 
  In the case of education, our findings indicate that educational outcomes are similar in 
households involved in cotton and in household involved in subsistence. This result holds for the 
whole population (all children between 7 and 18 years old), children in primary school and 
children in secondary school. 
4.  Conclusions 
 
  In this paper, we have examined the relationship between cotton reforms and poverty in 
Zambia. Cotton is one of the main cash crops of smallholders in suitable provinces in rural 
                                                 
19 It is also possible that the sample year is one of relatively good subsistence year but relatively bad cotton season. 
There is actually no evidence that this was so in 1998, however.  
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Zambia. Further, rural poverty is pronounced and widespread. The sector has experienced 
significant reforms that involved the movement from a publicly controlled parastatal firm, to 
privatization and competition. In this context, cotton is claimed to be a major market agricultural 
activity for vulnerable families in rural areas. 
  We have explored two angles of the cotton-poverty connection. On the one hand, we 
have simulated the welfare effects that would take place if agricultural cotton markets were 
liberalized and world price would thereby increase. On the other hand, we have estimated the 
differences in several outcomes between households involved in cotton and households involved 
in subsistence agriculture. 
  Our first finding shows that the domestic reforms have caused cotton shares to increase at 
the bottom of the income distribution. These are poor farmers. Regarding international market 
access, we estimate that the increase in world price would benefit cotton producers across the 
entire income distribution. An estimated 12.7 percent increase in prices would bring about 
welfare gains reaching roughly 1 percent of household income. In addition, we find that 
households involved in cotton enjoy income gains over households involved in subsistence. This 
implies that a movement from subsistence to market agriculture would benefit rural farmers and 
would lead to a further decline in poverty rates. After world trade reforms, for instance, the 
welfare gain of a switcher was estimated at approximately 21 percent. Further, productivity gains 
induced by extension services (improved during the marketing reforms) and made feasible by 
expanded international markets (due to Doha) would lead to welfare gains of 9 percent among 
cotton producers, and 30 percent among switchers. In terms of non-monetary outcomes, we find 
higher long-run nutritional status among children residing in cotton producing farms, but no 
significant differences in educational attainments.  
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  We believe that our results highlight promising avenues for poverty alleviation through 
cash agricultural activities such as cotton. It is important to notice that the estimated magnitudes 
are relatively small. This shows that to take full advantage of the access to international markets 
(with a liberalization of world agricultural markets), complementary policies are essential. These 
policies include extension services (information), infrastructure (transport), irrigation, access to 
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Table 6.1: Poverty in Zambia  
(head count) 
 
  1991 1996 1998 
National  69.6 80.0 71.5 
Rural  88.3 90.5 82.1 
Urban  47.2 62.1 53.4 
Note: The head count is the percentage of the population below the poverty 
line. Own calculations based on Priority Survey (1991), Living Conditions 
Monitoring Survey (1996) and Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 
(1998).   
 




 1991  1996  1998 
National 88.3  90.5  82.1 
Central 83.9  80.3  82.3 
Copperbelt 66.2 78.8 82.1 
Eastern 92.0  85.5  80.6 
Luapula 90.8  86.1  84.6 
Lusaka 70.9  78.1  75.7 
Northern 94.2  90.6  83.3 
North-Western 86.3  87.3  77.4 
Southern 85.4  82.5  73.0 
Western 94.1  92.9  90.3 
Note: Rural Poverty only. The head count is the percentage of the population 
below the poverty line. Own calculations based on Priority Survey (1991), 
Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (1996) and Living Conditions 
Monitoring Survey (1998).    
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Table 6.3: Sources of Income in Rural Areas  – 1998 
(percentage) 
 
 total  poor  non-poor 
Own  Production  42.5 42.9 42.0 
Sales of Food Crops  9.1  9.5  7.6 
Sales on non-Food Crops  3.8  4.0  2.9 
Livestock & Poultry  8.1  8.7  5.9 
Wages 6.9  5.9  10.3 
Income  non-farm  16.8 16.3 18.3 
Remittances  5.3 5.0 6.1 
Other  sources  7.5 7.7 6.9 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: The table reports income shares in rural areas. Own calculations based on Living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey (1998).   
 
Table 6.4: Income Shares From Agricultural Activities   
Rural Zambia (1998)   
P r o v i n c e  123456789 T o t a l
Cotton 8.4 0 9.5 0 0.8 0 0.1 2.8 0.2 3.1
Vegetables 1.1 2.8 0.3 0.2 1.2 0.7 0.5 1.7 0.3 0.8
Tobacco 0.2 0.1 2.3000 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 1 0 . 5
Groundnuts 0.9 0.7 2.4 2 0.2 1.4 1.1 0.4 0.2 1.2
P a p r i k a  00 0 . 10000000
Industrial maize  6.1 2 0.7 0.3 1.7 0.6 0.3 1.4 0.5 1.3
C a s s a v a  0 . 30 . 20 . 14 . 1 02 . 42 . 20 . 11 . 31 . 2
Maize 4.4 3.1 3.2 0.5 1.1 0.9 3.8 0.9 2.6 2.2
R i c e  0 00 . 30 . 1 00 . 1 0 01 . 20 . 2
Millet 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 1.3 0 0 0.2 0.4
Sorghum 0.1 0.2 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0 0.2 0.1
B e a n s  0 . 2 0 . 10 0 . 502 0 . 800 0 . 5
S o y a  b e a n s   0 . 40 0 . 4 0 . 100000 0 . 1
Sweet potatoes  0.9 2.8 0.1 1 0 0.3 1.6 0.1 0.5 0.7
I r i s h  p o t a t o e s   00 . 1 00 . 1 0 00 . 30 . 1 00 . 1
Sunflower 0.1 0 0.5 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0.1
Livestock 2.9 1.3 4.3 0.6 3.8 2 2.3 8 6.9 3.8
Poultry 6.4 2.2 4.5 2.7 5.9 3.4 2.8 4.6 6.7 4.3
Note: Income shares are in percentage. Provinces are indexed as follows. 1: Central, 2: Copperbelt, 3: Eastern, 4: 
Luapala, 5: Lusaka, 6: Northern, 7: North-Western, 8: Southern, 9: Western. Own calculations based on Living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey (1998).    
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Table 6.5: Income Gains from Cotton Production 
 
  Constrained Model    Constrained Model 
 (per  ha)    
    % of      % of 
   expenditure      expenditure 
Cotton 18232  19.9    21878  23.9 
 (7456)      (8947)   
Note: Results from propensity score matching of cotton farmers and 
subsistence farmers using kernel methods. Standard errors in parenthesis are 
estimated with bootstrap methods. The Constrained Model (per ha) assumes 
that the household has to give up one hectare of land to produce an 
additional hectare of cotton. The Constrained Model assumes that the farmer 
moves from subsistence to cotton and allocates the average plot size of 
cotton farmers (1.2 hectares).   
 
 Table 6.6: Child Nutrition in Rural Areas   
(0 to 59 months old) 
 
 z-score    Prevalence  rates 
 mean  Std.  Dev.   moderate  severe 
stunting (haz)  –2.21  1.77    23%  33% 
wasting (whz)  0.23  1.40    5%  1% 
underweight (waz)  –1.21  1.24    20%  6% 
Note: Height-for-age (haz) is a measure of accumulated undernutrition. 
Weight-for-height (whz) is used to measure levels of current 
undernutrition. Weight-for-age (waz) is used as a summary measure of 
nutritional status. In medicine, the prevalence rate is the proportion of 
individuals suffering a disease. Moderate refers to those individuals with a 
z-score between –3 and –2, and severe refers to a z-score below –3.   
 
Table 6.7: Effects on Child Nutrition and Education from Market Agriculture 
Cotton versus Subsistence 
 
Total  Males   Females 
Stunting wasting underwt.    stunting wasting underwt.   stunting wasting underwt. 
(haz) (whz) (waz)    (haz) (whz) (waz)    (haz) (whz) (waz) 
0.64 -0.004 0.34    1.07  -0.25 0.45    0.14  -0.004  0.07 
(0.34) (0.33) (0.24)    (0.63) (0.52) (0.45)    (0.85) (0.66) (0.37) 
                 
Total  Males   Females 
All primary  secondary    all primary secondary   all  primary secondary 
-0.02 -0.01 0.01    -0.03 -0.07 -0.02    0.01 -0.01 0.13 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)    (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)    (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) 
 Note: Results from propensity score matching of cotton farmers and subsistence farmers 
using kernel methods. Standard errors in parenthesis are estimated with bootstrap methods.  Figure 1
Dynamics of Cotton Income Shares
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Note: The graph shows the average cotton income shares in total income. These aver-
ages are estimated with non-parametric regressions (Fan, 1992; Pagan and Ullah, 1999).
The solid curve corresponds to cotton shares in 1998 and the broken line to the shares
in 1996. Own calculations based on the Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys of 1996
and 1998.
Figure 2
Dynamics of Cotton Income Shares
Central Province
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Note: The graph shows the average cotton income shares in total income. These aver-
ages are estimated with non-parametric regressions (Fan, 1992; Pagan and Ullah, 1999).
The solid curve corresponds to cotton shares in 1998 and the broken line to the shares
in 1996. Own calculations based on the Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys of 1996
and 1998.Figure 3
Dynamics of Cotton Income Shares
Eastern Province
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Note: The graph shows the average cotton income shares in total income. These aver-
ages are estimated with non-parametric regressions (Fan, 1992; Pagan and Ullah, 1999).
The solid curve corresponds to cotton shares in 1998 and the broken line to the shares
in 1996. Own calculations based on the Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys of 1996
and 1998.
Figure 4
Dynamics of Cotton Income Shares
Southern Province
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Note: The graph shows the average cotton income shares in total income. These aver-
ages are estimated with non-parametric regressions (Fan, 1992; Pagan and Ullah, 1999).
The solid curve corresponds to cotton shares in 1998 and the broken line to the shares
in 1996. Own calculations based on the Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys of 1996
and 1998.Figure 5
Cotton Prices and Household Income
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Note: The graph shows the average welfare eﬀects (deﬁned as the cotton shares
multiplied by the change in world cotton prices) at diﬀerent levels of household
per capita income. The curves are estimated with non-parametric locally weighted
regressions (Fan, 1992; Pagan and Ullah, 1999). The calculations are based on the
Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 1998.
Figure 6
Cotton Prices and Household Income
Regional Analysis
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Note: The graph shows the average welfare eﬀects (deﬁned as the cotton shares
multiplied by the change in world cotton prices) at diﬀerent levels of household per
capita income for the three cotton-producing provinces. The curves are estimated
with non-parametric locally weighted regressions (Fan, 1992; Pagan and Ullah,
1999). The solid, broken and dotted lines corresponds to the Central, Eastern,
and Southern provinces respectively. The calculations are based on the Living
Conditions Monitoring Survey 1998.Figure 7
Relative Probability of Cotton Production
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Note: The graph shows the average relative probability of being a cotton producer
at diﬀerent levels of household per capita income. The curves are estimated with
non-parametric locally weighted regressions (Fan, 1992; Pagan and Ullah, 1999).
The calculations are based on the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 1998.
Figure 8
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Note: The graph shows the average relative probability of being a cotton producer
at diﬀerent levels of household per capita income for the three cotton-producing
provinces. The curves are estimated with non-parametric locally weighted regres-
sions (Fan, 1992; Pagan and Ullah, 1999). The solid, broken and dotted lines
corresponds to the Central, Eastern, and Southern provinces respectively. The
calculations are based on the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 1998.